Multi-robot networks use wireless communication to provide wide-ranging services such as aerial surveillance and unmanned delivery. However, effective coordination between multiple robots requires trust, making them particularly vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Specifically, such networks can be gravely disrupted by the Sybil attack, where even a single malicious robot can spoof a large number of fake clients. This paper proposes a new solution to defend against the Sybil attack, without requiring expensive cryptographic key-distribution. Our core contribution is a novel algorithm implemented on commercial Wi-Fi radios that can "sense" spoofers using the physics of wireless signals. We derive theoretical guarantees on how this algorithm bounds the impact of the Sybil Attack on a broad class of robotic coverage problems. We experimentally validate our claims using a team of AscTec quadrotor servers and iRobot Create ground clients, and demonstrate spoofer detection rates over 96%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-robot networks rely on wireless communication to enable a wide range of tasks and applications: coverage [28, 6, 31] , disaster management [7] , surveillance [4] , and consensus [27] to name a few. The future promises an increasing trend in this direction, such as delivery drones which transport goods (e.g., Amazon Prime Air [2] ) or traffic rerouting algorithms (e.g., Google Maps Navigation) that rely on broadcasted user locations to achieve their goals. Effective coordination, however, requires trust. In order for these multi-robot systems to perform their tasks optimally, transmitted data is often assumed to be accurate and trustworthy; an assumption that is easy to break. A particularly challenging attack on this assumption is the so-called "Sybil attack."
In a Sybil attack a malicious agent generates (or spoofs) a large number of false identities to gain a disproportionate influence in the network. 1 These attacks are notoriously easy to implement [33] and can be detrimental to multi-robot networks. An example of this is coverage, where an adversarial client can spoof a cluster of clients in its vicinity in order to create a high local demand, in turn denying service to legitimate clients (Figure 1 ). Although a vast body of literature is dedicated to cybersecurity in general multi-node networks (e.g., a wired LAN), the same is not true for multi-robot networks [15, 30] , leaving them largely vulnerable to attack. This is because many characteristics unique to robotic networks make security more challenging; for example, traditional key passing or cryptographic authentication is difficult to maintain 1 Please refer to [8, 26] for a detailed treatment of this class of cyber attacks. Fig. 1 : Sybil Attack on Coverage: A server robot provides locational coverage to legitimate clients when no attack is present. In a Sybil attack, an adversary spoofs many fake clients to draw away coverage from the legitimate clients. due to the highly dynamic and distributed nature of multi-robot teams where clients often enter and exit the network. This paper addresses the challenge of guarding against Sybil attacks in multi-robot networks. We focus on the general class of problems where a group of server robots coordinate to provide some service using the broadcasted locations of a group of client robots. Our core contribution is a novel algorithm that analyzes the received wireless signals to detect the presence of spoofed clients spawned by adversaries. We call this a "virtual spoofer sensor" as we do not use specialized hardware nor encrypted key exchange, but rather a commercial Wi-Fi card and software to implement our solution. Our virtual sensor leverages the rich physical information already present in wireless signals. At a high level, as wireless signals propagate, they interact with the environment via scattering and absorption from objects along the traversed paths. Carefully processed, these signals can provide a unique signature or "spatial fingerprint" for each client, measuring the power of the signal received along each spatial direction (Fig. 2) . Unlike message contents such as reported IDs or locations which adversaries can manipulate, spatial fingerprints rely on physical signal interactions that cannot be exactly predicted [13, 24] .
Using these derived fingerprints, we show that a confidence weight, α ∈ (0, 1) can be obtained for each client in the network. We prove that these confidence weights have a desirable property where legitimate clients have an expected confidence weight close to one, while spoofed clients will have an expected confidence weight close to zero. A particularly attractive feature of confidence weight α is that it can be readily integrated as a per-client weighting function into a wide variety of multi-robot controllers. More importantly, the analytical bounds on these weights can provably limit the illeffects of spoofers on the performance of these controllers. This paper demonstrates this capability in the context of the The blue client has one line-of-sight peak; the other, 2 signal paths.
well-known locational coverage algorithm [6, 31] .
We provide an extensive experimental evaluation of our theoretical claims using a heterogeneous team of air/ground robots consisting of two AscTec Hummingbird platforms and ten iRobot Create platforms. We conduct our experiments in general indoor settings with randomly placed clients and demonstrate a spoofer detection rate of 96%. For the case of coverage we find that the converged positions of the service robots is on average 3 cm from optimal even when more than 75% of total clients in the network are spoofed.
Contributions of this paper:
We develop a virtual sensor for spoofing detection which provides performance guarantees in the presence of Sybil attacks and is applicable to a broad class of problems in distributed robotics. We show that the influence of spoofers is analytically bounded under our system in a coverage context, where each robotic node providing coverage remains within a radius of its position in the absence of an attack. Our theoretical results are validated extensively through experiments in diverse settings.
II. RELATED WORK
The problem of Sybil attacks has been studied in general multi-node, often static, networks, and many tools have been developed for these settings. Past work falls under three categories: (1) Cryptographic authentication schemes can be used to prevent Sybil attacks ( Table 7 in [39] ). These require trusted central authorities and computationally expensive distributed key management, to account for dynamic clients that enter and leave the network [39] . (2) Non-cryptographic techniques in the wireless networking community leverage wireless physical-layer information to detect spoofed client identities or falsified locations [16, 42, 40, 41] . These rely on bulky and expensive hardware like large multi-antenna arrays, that cannot be mounted on small robotic platforms.
(3) Recent techniques have attempted to use wireless signal information like received signal strength (RSSI) [37, 29] and channel state information [22] . Such techniques need clients to remain static, since mobility can cause wireless channels to fluctuate rapidly [3] . In addition, they are susceptible to power-scaling attacks, where clients scale power differently to imitate different users. In sum, the above systems share one or more of the following characteristics making them ill-suited to multi-robot networks: (1) require computationally-intensive key management; (2) rely on bulky and expensive hardware;
(3) assume static networks. Indeed past work has highlighted the gravity and apparent sparsity of solutions to cyber-security threats in multi-robot networks [15, 30, 5] .
Unlike past work, our solution has three attributes that particularly suit multi-robot networks. (1) It captures physical properties of wireless signals and therefore does not require distributed key management. (2) It relies on cheap commodity Wi-Fi radios, unlike hardware-based solutions [40, 42] . (3) It is robust to client mobility and power-scaling attacks. Finally, our system builds on Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) to construct signal fingerprints [9] . SAR has been widely used for radar imaging [9, 17] and indoor positioning [19, 18, 36, 12] . In contrast, this paper builds upon SAR to provide cyber-security to multi-robot networks. In doing so, it provides theoretical security guarantees that are validated experimentally. These integrate readily with performance guarantees of existing multi-robot controllers, like the well-known robotic coverage controllers [6, 31] as shown in Sec. §VI.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This paper focuses on problems where the knowledge of agent positions facilitates some collaborative task. Specifically, it assumes two groups of agents, "clients" requiring some type of location-based service such as coverage or goods delivery and "servers" whose positions are optimized in order to provide the service to its clients. Let P := {p 1 , . . . , p c } denote the client positions in R 3 . Let X := {x 1 , . . . , x m } be the positions of the servers in R 3 and the notation [m] = {1, . . . , m} denote their indices. We consider the case where a subset of the clients, S ⊂ P (with s := |S|) are "spoofed" clients.
Definition 3.1 (Spoofed Client): A single malicious client may generate multiple unique identities, each with a fabricated position. Each generated, or "spawned" identity is considered a spoofed client. By spoofing multiple clients, the malicious client gains a disproportionate influence in the network. All clients which are not spoofed are considered legitimate clients. Threat Model: Our threat model considers one or more adversarial robot clients with one Wi-Fi antenna each. The adversaries can be mobile and scale power on a per-packet basis. We only consider adversarial clients. 2 Adversarial clients perform the "Sybil Attack" to forge packets emulating s nonexistent clients, where s can exceed the number of legitimate clients. More formally: Definition 3.2 (Sybil Attack): Define a network of client and server positions as P ∪ X, where a subset S of the clients are spoofed, such that P = S ∪S. We assume that set P is known but knowledge of which clients are spoofed (i.e., in S) is unknown. This attack is called a "Sybil Attack."
To counter the Sybil attack, this paper has two objectives. First, we find a relation capturing directional signal strength between a client i and a server l. We seek a mapping F il : [0, π 2 ] × [0, 2π] → R such that for any 3D direction (θ, φ) defined in Fig. 4 , the value F il (θ, φ) is the power of the received signal from client i along that direction. Using this mapping, or "fingerprint", our first problem is to derive a confidence weight whose expectation is provably bounded near 1 for legitimate clients and near 0 for spoofed clients. Further, we wish to find these bounds analytically from problem parameters like the signal-to-noise ratio of the received wireless signal. We summarize this objective as Problem 1 below: Problem 1: Spoofer Detection Let F i be the set of fingerprints measured from all clients j ∈ [c] and servers l ∈ [m] in the neighborhood, N i , of client i. 3 Here, a neighborhood of client i, N i , are all agents that can receive Wi-Fi transmissions sent by client i. Using F i , derive a confidence weight α i (F i ) ∈ (0, 1) and a threshold ω i (σ 2 i ) > 0 where σ 2 i represents error variances such as the signal-to-noise ratio that are assumed to be given. Find ω i (·) to have the provable property of differentiating spoofed clients whereby spoofed clients are bounded below this threshold, i.e., E[α i ] ≤ ω, and legitimate clients are bounded above this threshold
Our second objective is to apply our spoofer detection method to multi-robot control problems. We consider the well-known coverage problem in [6, 31] . We show that by integrating the confidence weight from Problem 1, we can analytically bound the error in performance caused by spoofed clients in the network. We consider the coverage problem where an importance function is defined over an environment and where the positions of the clients correspond to peaks in the importance function. Here, servers position themselves to maximize their proximity to these peaks, to improve their coverage over client robots. If C V = {x * 1 , . . . , x * m } is the set of server positions optimized by the coverage controller with zero spoofers, we wish to guarantee that server positions optimized with spoofers present, C Vα , is "close" to C V . We state this second objective more specifically as Problem 2 below: Problem 2: Sybil-resillience in Multi-Robot Coverage Consider a locational coverage problem where an importance function ρ(q) > 0 is defined over an environment Q ⊂ R 3 and q ∈ Q. Specifically, consider an importance function that can be decomposed into terms, ρ i (q), depending on each client's position, i ∈ [c] (for example, each client position corresponds to a peak), i.e., ρ(q) = ρ 1 (q) + . . . + ρ c (q). Let C V = {x * 1 , . . . , x * m } be the set of server positions returned by an optimization of ρ(q) over X, where there are zero spoofed clients in the network. Under a Sybil attack, let C Vα = {x 1 , . . . , x m } be the set of server positions returned by an optimization of an α-modified importance function ρ(q) = α 1 ρ 1 (q) + . . . + α c ρ c (q) where the importance weight terms α i satisfy the bounds stated in Problem 1. We wish to find an ǫ(P) > 0 such that the set C Vα is within a distance ǫ(P) to C V . C Vα is within a distance ǫ(P) to C V if ∀x ∈ C Vα there exists a unique y ∈ C V where dist(x, y) < ǫ(P). Here, P is a set of problem parameters that we wish to find.
Intuitively, solutions to Problem 2 guarantee that under a Sybil attack, all server positions computed using an α-modified coverage controller are within a computable distance ǫ(P) from their optimal positions (i.e., in the absence of spoofers). Sec. §VI derives a closed-form for ǫ(P) and shows the set P of problem parameters to be the number of spoofers, the footprint of the environment covered, and signal noise.
IV. FINGERPRINTS TO DETECT MALICIOUS CLIENTS
Here we construct a fingerprint, a directional signal strength profile for a communicating server-client pair. Our choice of signal fingerprints have many desirable properties that enable us to derive a robust spoof-detection metric: they 1) capture directional information of the transmitted signal source and thus are well-suited for flagging falsely reported client positions, 2) can be obtained for a single server-client pair, unlike location estimation techniques such as triangulation which require multiple servers to coordinate, 3) cannot be manipulated by the client, since the occurrence of each signal path is due to environment reflections, 4) are applicable in complex multipath environments where a transmitted signal is scattered off of walls and objects;since these scattered signals manifest themselves as measurable peaks in the fingerprint, complex multipath contributes significantly to fingerprint uniqueness.
We construct fingerprints using wireless channels h, complex numbers measurable on any wireless device characterizing the attenuation in power and the phase rotation that signals experience as they propagate over the air. These channels also capture the fact that wireless signals are scattered by the environment, arriving at the receiver over (potentially) several different paths [35] . Fig. 3 is an example 2D schematic of a wireless signal traversing from a client robot to a server robot arriving along two separate paths: one attenuated direct path at 40 • and one reflected at 60 • . If the server robot had a directional antenna, it could obtain a full 3D profile of power of the received signal (i.e., |h| 2 ) along every spatial direction. We use such a 3-D profile as a "spatial fingerprint" that can help distinguish between different clients.
Unfortunately directional antennas are composed of large arrays of many antennas that are too bulky for small agile robot platforms. Luckily, a well-known technique called Synthetic Aperture Radar [9] (SAR) can be used to emulate such an antenna using a commodity Wi-Fi radio. Its key idea is to use small local robotic motion, such as spinning in-place, to obtain multiple snapshots of the wireless channel that are then processed like a directional array of antennas. SAR can be implemented using a well-studied signal processing algorithm called MUSIC [14] to obtain spatial fingerprints at each server robot.
Mathematically, we obtain a spatial fingerprint for each wireless link between a server l and client i as a matrix F il : R × R → R. For each spatial path represented as (θ, φ) (see Fig. 4 ), F ij maps to a scalar value representing the signal power received along that path. More formally:
(1) Whereĥ il is a vector of the ratio of wireless channel snapshots between two antennas mounted on the body of the server l and 
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Fig. 5: Table of Most Common Notations
, λ is the wavelength of the signal and r is the distance between the antennas, B l , Γ l are the server's angular orientation, Eig n (·) are noise eigenvectors, (·) † is conjugate transpose, and k is the number of signal eigenvectors, equal to the number of paths.
While our above formulation is derived from MUSIC [14] , it varies in one important way: while MUSIC uses a singleantenna channel snapshot h il , we use the channel ratioĥ il = h 1 il /h 2 il between two antennas. This modification provides resilience to intentional power scaling by the sender since scaling his transmit power by χ yields a measured ratiô h il = χh 1 il /(χh 2 il ); a value unaffected by power scaling.
V. CONSTRUCTING A CLIENT CONFIDENCE WEIGHT Given a client fingerprint F il (φ, θ) for each client i relative to a robotic server l, we wish to generate a confidence weight α i ∈ [0, 1] that approaches 1 for legitimate clients, and 0 otherwise. We achieve this by defining α i as the product of two terms β i and γ ij that go to 0 if a client reports a falsified location or has the same fingerprint as another client j respectively. In particular, β i is termed the honesty metric and is the likelihood (Eq. (2)) that client i is indeed along its reported direction (φ il , θ il ) with respect to each server l in its neighborhood. The second term γ ij is the similarity metricthe likelihood that client i's fingerprint as seen by server l is not unique compared to that of a different client j of server l. Finally, α i is the product of 1) β i and 2) (1 − γ ij ) over all j = i, which compares client i's fingerprint with all other clients in its neighborhood and approaches 0 if client i's profile is not unique. Therefore if either the honesty term or similarity term goes to 0, the weight α i for client i also approaches zero.
Here, L(·) denotes an event likelihood, (φ il , θ il ) is the reported direction of client i with respect to server l, and the neighborhood N i are servers communicating with client i. Defining Honesty and Similarity Metrics: The honesty metric β i and similarity metric γ ij are derived using peak locations in client fingerprints. In practice however, peaks may have slight shifts owing to noise. Thus, any comparison between peak locations must permit some variance due to these shifts. Fortunately, noise in wireless environments can be modeled closely as additive white-Gaussian [35] . As the following lemma shows, this results in peak shifts that are also Gaussian, meaning that their variance is easy to model and account for. More formally, the lemma states that shifts are normally distributed with zero mean and well-defined variance, based on the wireless medium's signal-to-noise ratio (SNR):
Lemma 5.1: Let ∆θ i , ∆φ i denote the error between the azimuthal and polar angle of the uncorrelated i th path of a (potentially multipath) source and the corresponding angles of the (local) maximum in the fingerprint F (φ, θ), over several uniformly gathered packets (i.e., SAR snapshots) for θ ∈ (10 • , 80 • ). Then ∆θ i and ∆φ i are normally distributed with a mean 0, and expected variance σ 2 φ and σ 2 θ :
Where, λ is the wavelength of the signal, SN R is the signalto-noise ratio in the network 4 , M is the number of packets per-rotation, and r is the distance between the antennas. The above lemma follows from well-known Cramer-Rao bounds [25, 11, 10] shown previously for linear antenna movements in SAR [34] but readily extensible to circular rotations (proof in supplementary text [1] ). Using this lemma, we can define the honesty metric β i as the likelihood that the client is at its reported location, subject to this Gaussian error and additional measurement error in reported locations.
. We denoteσ 2 φ andσ 2 θ as the variances in angles σ 2 φ and σ 2 θ plus any variance due to measurement error of reported locations that can be calibrated from device hardware. We define β i for client i as:
Where g(x; µ, σ 2 ) = min(1, √ 2πf (x; µ, σ 2 )) is a normalized Gaussian PDF f (x; µ, σ 2 ) with mean µ and variance σ 2 .
In practice, reported client locations are subject to measurement errors due to position sensor inaccuracies. Our definition of β i above accounts for this by using the effective varianceŝ σ 2 φ andσ 2 θ that are the sum of the variance in angles, σ 2 φ and σ 2 θ , in addition to the variances due to measurement error. Using Lemma 5.1 we define the similarity metric γ ij as the likelihood that two client fingerprints share identical peaks:
and (Φ jl , Θ jl ) denote the set of local maxima, ordered by non-decreasing angle values, in fingerprints F il and F jl . We define γ ij for client i relative to client j as:
Where g(·; µ, σ 2 ) is from Definition. 5.2, and the factor of 2 in the variance accounts for computing the difference of two normally distributed values.
Defining the Confidence Weight: We notice that Eqn. 2, 3 and 4 fully define α i for each client i. In summary, the confidence weight is computed in three steps: (1) Obtain the client fingerprint using SAR on wireless signal snapshots.
(2) Measure the variance of peak locations of these client fingerprints using their Signal-to-Noise Ratio. (3) Compute the similarity and honesty metrics using their above definitions to obtain the confidence weight. Algorithm 1 below summarizes the steps to construct α i for a given client i. 
We now present our main result that solves Problem 1 in the problem statement (Sec. §III). The following theorem says the expected α i 's of legitimate nodes approach 1, while those of spoofers approach 0, allowing us to discern them under well- 3) The clients transmit enough packets to emulate a large antenna array (in practice, 25 − 30 packets per second). 5 Theorem 5.4: Consider a network with m servers and c clients. A new client i either: 1) spoofs s clients reporting a random location, potentially scaling power, or; 2) is a uniformly randomly located legitimate client. Let α spoof , α legit be the confidence weights in either case. Assume that the client obtains its signals from servers along k paths (where the number of paths k is defined by Eqn. §1 in Sec. §IV). Under A.1-A.3, the expected α spoof , α legit are bounded by:
Where κ = ( √ 2 + √ π)/π 2 , σ θ , σ φ ,σ θ ,σ φ are the variances defined in Lemma 5.1 that depend on signal-to-noise ratio (the latter include measurement error in reported locations).
Proof Sketch: To give some intuition on why the theorem holds, we provide a brief proof sketch (proof in supplementary text [1] ). To begin with, notice from their definitions that both the honesty metric β i and confidence metric γ ij inspect peaks in fingerprints F il (Lemma 5.1). For the honesty metric β i of a legitimate node, this peak location should be normally distributed (subject to noise, measurement error) around the reported location. For a spoofer that reports a random location, the peak location is uniformly distributed. A similar (but inverse) argument holds for γ ij . Hence, we simply need to show is that the definitions of β i and γ i which are both products of the form g(X) can be bounded in expectation if X is uniform or normally distributed. To this end, consider two random variables u and ν which are respectively uniform and normally distributed between 0 and 2π with mean 0 and variance σ 2 . Let S = √ 2σ(ln 1 σ ) 0.5 , the value at which the minimization in g(x) is triggered. E[g(ν)] and E[g(u)] are as follows:
Where erf(·) is the well known Error function and using 1−erf(x) < e −x 2 . Similarly, we can evaluate E[u(n)] as:
By assumptions A.1-A.3, we can apply these bounds to write the expectation of the honesty metric β i as a product of those of the independent variables:
Applying a similar argument, the similarity metric γ is:
Combining the above equations, we prove Eqn. 5. A natural question one might ask is if the above lemma holds in general environments, where its assumptions A.1-A.3 may be too stringent. Our extensive experimental results in Sec. VII show that our bounds on α approximately predict performance in general environments. Further, Sec. §VII-A shows that results from an anechoic chamber, which emulate free-space conditions where the lemma's assumptions can be directly enforced, tightly follow the bounds of Lemma 5.1.
In sum, one can adopt the above lemma to distinguish adversarial nodes from legitimate nodes, purely based on α. However, an interesting alternative is to incorporate α directly into multi-robot controllers to give provable service guarantees to legitimate nodes. The next section show how α i readily integrates with robotic coverage controllers, in particular.
VI. THREAT-RESISTANT DISTRIBUTED CONTROL
This section describes how our spoof detection method from Sec. §V integrates with well-known coverage controllers from [6, 31, 32] . The area coverage problem deals with positioning server robots to minimize their Euclidean distance to certain areas of interest in the environment. These areas are determined by an importance function ρ(q) that is defined over the environment Q ⊂ R 3 of size L(Q). For our coverage problem, the peaks of the importance are determined by client positions P , e.g., ρ(q, P ) = ρ 1 (q) + . . . + ρ c (q) where ρ i (q) quantifies the influence of client i's position on the importance function. Using [6, 31, 32] , server robot positions optimizing coverage over ρ(q, P ) will minimize their distance to clients.
To account for spoofed clients, we modify the importance function ρ(q, P ) using the α i for each client i ∈ [c] that is computed by Algorithm 1. E.g., we can multiply each client-term in ρ(q, P ) by its corresponding confidence weight: ρ(q, P ) α = α 1 ρ 1 (q) + . . . + α c ρ c (q). Given the properties of these weights derived in Theorem 5.4, i.e., α i is bounded near zero for a spoofed client and near one for a legitimate client, the effect of multiplication by the α's is that terms corresponding to spoofed clients will be bounded to a small value (see Fig. 6 ); providing resilience to the spoofing attack.
For simplicity, we assume the importance function ρ(q) is static (from [6] ) and α's from Algorithm 1 are computed once, at the beginning of the coverage algorithm. We note that our approach readily extends to the adaptive case in [31, 32] when the importance function (and location of clients) change, by having the service robots exchange their learned importance function. This in turn can trigger a re-calculation of α values.
We now show that computed server positions are impacted by spoofers to within a closed-form bound, that depends on is the maximal effect that the presence of spoofed clients can have on the importance function. Intuitively, all spoofed clients have a weight of at maximum a and all legitimate clients have a reduced weight of at minimum b. Using this observation we can bound the influence of the spoofed clients on computed server control inputs (see Fig. 6 ). Specifically, recall from [6] that the position control for each server is:
Mv V qρ(q)dq and V is the voronoi partition for server l defined as all points q ∈ Q with dist(q, x l ) < dist(q, x g ) where g = l. Using the importance function from above we can write
where C VS is the component of the centroid computed over spoofed nodes and C VL is the component of the centroid computed over legitimate nodes and M Vα is defined shortly. We rewrite C VS as a perturbation of the centroid over legitimate nodes as C VS = C VL + v e where v is an arbitrary unit vector and the magnitude of e can be as large as the length of the operative environment, e ≤ L(Q). Let the total mass be T = M Vs +M VL . We can write a similar expression for the mass M Vα using the bounds a and b as M Vα = bT + (a − b)M VL . Substituting these expressions into C Vα and simplifying gives C Vα = CV L +b v e bT +(a−b)MV L . Combining this expression with the server control input:
Where k = −2(bT + aM VL ). If (a + b) = 1, this control input drives the server robot l to a neighborhood of size ǫ = b e ≤ bL(Q) centered around the centroid C L defined over the legitimate clients.
then we have (a + b) = 1 as desired, proving the lemma.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section describes our results from an experimental evaluation of our theoretical claims. Our aerial servers were implemented on two AscTec Atomboard computing platforms equipped with Intel 5300 Wi-Fi cards with two antennas each, mounted on two As-cTec Hummingbird quadrotors. Our clients were ten iRobot Create robots, each equipped with Asus EEPC netbooks and single-antenna Wi-Fi cards. An adversarial client forged multiple identities by spawning multiple packets containing different identities (up to 75% of the total number of legitimate clients in the system), and could use a different transmit power for each identity. The adversary advertised identities by modifying the Wi-Fi MAC field, a common technique for faking multiple identities [33] . Evaluation: We evaluate our system in two environments: 1) An indoor multipath-rich environment with walls and obstacles equipped with a Vicon motion capture system to aid quadrotor navigation; 2) An anechoic chamber to emulate a free-space setting that is particularly challenging to our system. We estimated the average theoretical expected standard deviation to be σ θ , σ φ of 0.7 • (Lemma 5.1). After including the standard deviation in reported location, based on the known errors of our localization framework, this increased the averageσ θ ,σ φ by 2 • (variances in each experiment depend on measured SNR) We compare our system against a baseline that uses a Received Signal Strength (RSSI) comparison (akin to [29] ). Roadmap: We conduct three classes of experiments: (1) Microbenchmarks to validate our client confidence metric, both in free-space and multipath indoor environments (Sec. §VII-A).
(2) Experiments applying this confidence metric to quarantine adversaries (Sec. §VII-B). (3) Application of our system to secure the coverage problem against Sybil attacks (Sec. §VII-C).
A. Microbenchmarks on the Confidence Metric
This experiment studies the correctness of our system's confidence metric α. Recall from theory in §V that α's measured by a server robot distinguish between unique clients based on their diverse physical directions and the presence of multipath reflections. Thus, a free-space environment (i.e., with no multipath) is particularly challenging to our system. Method: To approximate free-space, we measured α values in a radio-frequency anechoic chamber which attenuates reflected paths by about 60 dB, for a legitimate and malicious client from one server robot 12 m away. Next, in a 10 m x 8 m indoor room (a typical multipath case), we measured α's from one server for up to ten legitimate clients and ten spoofed clients. Results: In Fig. 7 , the values of α in the anechoic chamber tightly follow our theoretical bounds in Theorem 5.4 (Fig. 8(c) ). As expected, our results in indoor multipath environments exhibit a larger variance but follow the trend suggested by theory. Further, we stress our confidence metric by isolating the case of colinearity in both environments. In Fig. 8 , we consider a spoofing adversary initially co-aligned with a legitimate client, and measure α as the angle of separation, φ, is increased from 0 • to 20 • relative to the server robot. In the anechoic chamber at φ close to 0 • , the fingerprints of both the legitimate and adversarial nodes are virtually identical, each with precisely one peak at 0 • . Consequently, α for the legitimate node is much below 1, indicating that is believed to be adversarial (i.e., the term 1 − γ in α approaches 0 in Eqn. 2). However, α for the legitimate client quickly approaches 1, even if φ = 3 • in the anechoic chamber. In fact, α is virtually identical to 1 beyond 10 • , indicating that a single server robot can distinguish closely aligned legitimate and adversarial clients even in free-space. Fig. 8b shows that multipath can distinguish clients even at φ = 0 • , due to additional reflected paths that help disambiguate these clients.
B. Performance of Sybil Attack Detection
In this experiment, we measure our system's classification performance on legitimate and spoofed clients, in the presence of static, mobile, and power-scaling adversaries. Method: This experiment was performed in the multipath-rich indoor testbed with walls and obstacles. Each run consisted of one quadrotor server, and (randomly positioned) ten control clients, or nine legitimate clients with an adversary reporting two to nine spoofed clients. Each Sybil attack was performed under three modalities: (1) a stationary attacker with a fixed transmission power, (2) a mobile attacker (random-walk and linear movements), and (3) an attacker scaling the per-packet power by a different amount for each spoofed client, from 1 to 31 mW. The quadrotor server classifies clients with an α < 0.5 as spoofed (see Fig. 7 ). The baseline RSSI classifier uses a 2 dB thresholded minimum dissimilarity, a technique previously applied in static networks [29, 37] . Results: For each modality, our performance against an RSSI baseline over multiple network topologies is summarized here to legitimate clients ( ) and six spoofed clients ( ). We consider: (a) an insecure system where each spoofed client creates a false peak in the importance function, (b) a ground truth importance function, and (c) our system where applying α weights from Algorithm 1 recovers the true importance function. (d) depicts a ground-truth cost computed with respect to legitimate clients as Sybil nodes dynamically enter the network. Our system (red dotted line) performs near-optimal even when spoofed clients comprise more than twice the network. wireless channels in computing α (Sec. §IV). Our client classifier exhibits consistent performance in both power-scaling and mobile scenarios with a TPR ≈ 96% and FPR ≈ 4%.
C. Application to Multi-Agent Coverage
We implement the multi-agent coverage problem from [6] , where a team of aerial servers position themselves to minimize their distance to client robots at reported positions p i ,i ∈ [c]. We use an importance function ρ(q, P ) = ρ 1 (q) + . . . + ρ c (q) defined in Sec. §VI where each client term is a Gaussian-shaped function ρ i (q) = exp(− 1 2 (q − p i ) T (q − p i )) ( Fig. 9b ). An α-modified importance function is implemented as ρ(q, P ) α = α 1 ρ 1 (q) + . . . + α c ρ c (q) where the α terms are computed using Algorithm 1 (Fig. 9c) . Method. This experiment was performed in the multipath-rich indoor testbed. For each experiment we randomly place three clients in an 8 m x 10 m room with two AscTec quadrotor servers. Fig. 9 (a)-(c) shows one client-server topology where an adversary spoofs six Sybil clients. Upon convergence, we measure the distance of each server from an optimal location in 3 scenarios: 1) a naive system with no security, 2) an oracle which discards Sybil clients a priori, and 3) our system. Results: Fig. 9 (a)-(c) depicts the converged locations for a candidate topology in the above three scenarios. We observe that by incorporating α weights in our controller, our system approximates oracle performance. Fig. 9d demonstrates the ability of our system to bound the service cost to near optimal even as spoofers enter the network (comprising up to 300%). Aggregate Results: Across multiple topologies and 12 runs, with no security the maximum distance from each quadrotor to an oracle solution is on average 3.77 m (stdev: 0.86). Our system achieves a 0.02 m (stdev: 0.02) average from oracle.
VIII. CONCLUSION In this paper, we develop a new system to guard against the Sybil attack in multi-robot networks. We derive theoretical guarantees on the performance of our system, which are validated experimentally. While this paper has focused on coverage, it can be readily extended to secure other multi-robot controllers against Sybil attacks, e.g., unmanned delivery [20] , search-and-rescue [21] , and formation control [38] . We note for future work that our method of detecting spoofed clients is applicable to servers as well, since they also communicate wirelessly. Since our approach is based on the fundamental physics of wireless signals, we believe that it will easily generalize beyond Sybil attacks to other Wi-Fi based security issues in robot-swarms such as packet path validation [23] and detecting packet injection attacks to name a few.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL -PROOFS Guaranteeing Spoof-Resilient Multi-Robot Networks
This supplementary material provides detailed proofs of the lemmas and theorems submitted in the original paper. We note that these lemmas and proofs make the following assumptions that we repeat here for convenience: Then for a ∆θ i and ∆φ i are normally distributed with a mean 0, and expected variance σ 2 φ and σ 2 θ , respectively, defined below:
Where, λ is the wavelength of the signal, SN R is the signalto-noise ratio in the network, M is the number of packets per-rotation, and r is the distance between the antennas. Proof: Cramer-Rao bounds calculate estimated performance for given geometries of antenna trajectories in an algorithmindependent manner. It is well-known that algorithms such as MUSIC achieve the Cramer-Rao bound (CRB) [2, 3, 5] . Using the result in [5] , for a sufficiently large number of packets M , the error in angle for the uncorrelated path i using the Cramer-Rao bound has a mean 0 and variance σ 2 where:
Where SN R is the signal to noise ratio in the network, A is the steering vector of the MUSIC algorithm [4] and D is its derivative with respect to the angle. Let us consider the quadrotor retrieves samples at a set of uniform angles {0, ∆, 2∆, . . . , (M − 1)∆}, where ∆ = 2π M . For the azimuthal angle, these values are given by: 
Substituting these values in Eqn. 1, we have:
Similarly, for the polar angle, we can write:
Again, substituting these values in Eqn. 1, we have:
Note that these values for σ 2 φ and σ 2 θ are defined for large values of M . Applying the central-limit theorem, it is well known that the average of any distribution over a large number of samples is asymptotically normal [1] . As a result, the distributions of φ i and θ i are asymptotically normally distributed with a mean of zero and variance given by Eqn. 4 and Eqn. 5. Assuming θ is uniformly in (10 • , 80 • ), and using the corresponding expected values of 1/ sin 2 θ i and 1/ cos 2 θ i to be 4.5, we have:
This proves the required lemma. Lemma 1.2: Let us define g(x; 0, σ 2 ) as
Where f (x; 0, σ 2 ) is density function of the Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance σ 2 . Then if the random variable u is uniformly distributed between and (0, 2π) and the random variable n is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2 , then their expectations obey the following:
Proof: Notice that by the definition of the Gaussian distribution √ 2πf (x; 0, σ 2 ) < 1 occurs only if:
i.e., e − x 2 2σ 2 < σ (10)
x > √ 2σ ln
Let us first evaluate E[g(n)]. We can write this as:
Where erf(·) is the well known Error function and erfc(·) is its complement. The error function is related to the CDF of the normal distribution F (x; 0; σ 2 ) as:
. Similarly, we can evaluate E[u(n)] as:
Eqn. 14 and 16 together prove the lemma. Lemma 1.3: Assuming a network of m routers, and a client i which reports either: 1) Its legitimate location given by {(θ il , φ ri )}; or 2) A fake (spoofer) location chosen uniformly at random. Then the corresponding values of β i , i.e. β legit and β spoof have an expectation given by:
Where,σ θ ,σ φ are the variances defined in Lemma 1.1.
Proof: Let us first evaluate the component of β legit the confidence metric of a genuine client-i. Let's assume the direction of this client closest to its true location from the profile is (φ F il , θ F il ). Then, the following results hold:
Where m il , n il are normally distributed. We can write the analogous metric if the client is an adversary as:
Where u il , v il are uniformly distributed. Generalizing to m independent routers, we can write:
Eqn. 21 and 22 prove the above Lemma 1.3.
Lemma 1.4: Assume a network of m routers serving a client j. We assume a new client i joins the network, which does not report its location. Without loss of generality, this client: 1) either spoofs client-j, potentially scaling power, or; 2) a randomly located legitimate client. Let γ spoof , γ legit denote the second component γ ij of the confidence metrics measured in either cases. Then the expected value of these confidence metrics are bounded by:
Where, σ θ , σ φ are the variances defined in Lemma 1.1 that depend on signal-to-noise ratio and k is the number of maxima in the fingerprint of client i.
Proof:
Let us first evaluate the component of γ legit the confidence metric of a genuine client-i, in relation to router l and client-j. Let's assume set of k directions of this client Φ legit,r = {φ legit,1 , . . . , φ legit,k }, Θ legit,r = {θ legit,1 , . . . , θ legit,k } are uniformly at random. For the moment, let's consider γ legit pertaining to a legitimate client-i. Then, the following results hold:
Where u p , v p are uniformly at random as well, and κ is a constant normalization factor to ensure the likelihood is at most 1. We can write the analogous metric if client-i is an adversary as: 
Where m p , n p are normally distributed. Assuming fingerprints from routers are independent, we can write the expectations across routers in the two cases as:
Eqn. 28 and 27 prove the above Lemma 1.4.
II. THEOREM
Theorem 2.1: Let us consider a network with m servers and c clients. A new client i either: 1) spoofs s clients reporting a random location, potentially scaling power, or; 2) is a randomly located legitimate client. Let α spoof , α legit be the confidence metrics measured in either case. Let us assume that the client obtains its signals from servers along k paths. We assume: (1) The paths are independent and uncorrelated.
(2) Errors in azimuth and polar angles are independent. (3) The clients transmit a large number of packets M . Then, the expected value of these confidence metrics are bounded by:
Where κ = ( √ 2 + √ π)/π 2 , σ θ , σ φ ,σ θ ,σ φ are the variances defined in Lemma 1.1 that depend on signal-to-noise ratio (the latter include measurement error in reported locations). Proof: Using Lemma 1.4, we can write:
Combining over s spoofers and c − s legitimate clients, we can write:
Combining the above equations with Lemma 1.3, we can write:
Which proves the required lemma.
